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László Vértesy
DEBT MANAGEMENT STRATEGIES OF LOCAL 
GOVERNMENTS IN THE EU
Helyi önkormányzati adósságkezelési stratégiák az Európai Unióban
Dr. habil. László Vértesy PhD jur. PhD oec. associate professor, University of Public 
Service, Faculty of Public Governance and International Studies, Lőrincz Lajos 
Department of Administrative Law, vertesy.laszlo@uni-nke.hu
A considerable part of public debt originates from the budgetary practices of local governments: 
this amounted to nearly 850 billion euros, which was 6.7% of the EU‑28’s general government gross 
debt in 2018. This paper briefly presents the magnitude and relevance of local government debt 
at a national level, then it outlines the effective debt management strategies taking a multi‑level 
governance approach. Four debt management categories can be classified: changing the conditions, 
repayment strategies, additional resources and, finally, state intervention. Unfortunately, there are 
no good/best practices for the first two methods. For additional resources, in some Mediterranean 
and Scandinavian countries, state or local government‑owned specialised financial institutions 
were established, while in other European countries, the state pays the bailout or consolidation 
by overtaking the unsustainable local debts. In most cases, only the direct and/or indirect state 
intervention methods were proven to be successful solutions.
Keywords:
local government, public debt, debt management
Az államadósság egy meghatározó része az önkormányzatok költségvetési gyakorlatából szár‑
mazik, a  közel 850 milliárd euró az  EU‑28 ország államadósságának 6,7%‑a volt 2018‑ban. 
A tanulmány röviden bemutatja az önkormányzati adósság nagyságát és relevanciáját nemzeti 
szinten, majd központi gondolata a hatékony adósságkezelési stratégiák elemzése a helyi és köz‑
ponti kormányzati szinteken. Négy adósságkezelési kategóriát lehet elkülöníteni: a feltételek meg‑
változtatása, a  visszafizetési stratégiák, a  kiegészítő források és  végül az  állami beavatkozás. 
Sajnos az első két módszernél nincs jó vagy legjobb gyakorlat. További források elérése érdekében 
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néhány mediterrán és skandináv országban állami vagy önkormányzati tulajdonú szakosított 
pénzügyi intézményeket hoztak létre. Más európai országokban az állam vállalta a kimentést 
vagy konszolidációt a fenntarthatatlan helyi adósságok felszámolásával. A legtöbb esetben csak 
a közvetlen és/vagy közvetett állami beavatkozási módszerek bizonyultak sikeres megoldásoknak.
Kulcsszavak:
önkormányzat, államadósság, adósságkezelés
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1. INTRODUCTION
Public debt is still a  quotidian topic in economics, most countries worldwide face its 
management challenges. A distinct part of these burdens originates from the budgetary 
practices of local governments. According to the European practice, the local government 
subsystem is part of the general government budget, but it is separated from the central 
budget; it is linked to the central budget by supports. In some European countries, 
unsustainable local government debt has emerged as a problem during and after the recent 
financial crises, as a consequence of the central transfer reductions (Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Portugal, Spain, Romania, United Kingdom).1
The Maastricht Treaty contains certain provisions on public finances, specifically, Article 
126 and 140 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union prescribes that general 
government debt shall not exceed 60% of the gross domestic product. This extenuates the 
economic importance of effective budgetary management of local governments, since their 
debt also needs to be calculated into the national public debt, according to the unified 
methodology.2
As a generally accepted golden principle – in accordance with the financial autonomy –, 
the consequences of the loss-making management of the local government are borne by the 
local government, and the central budget is not responsible for its obligations. Therefore, 
only the local government is liable for sustainable local finances and debt management. 
For EU member states this problem has pivotal importance both from a legislative and an 
economic point of view.
The European Charter of Local Self-Government guarantees the financial self‑
determination of the budget for municipalities, but this autonomy needs to be exercised 
within clear policies, with prudential macroeconomic limits to borrowing and processes 
of public scrutiny.3 Sustainable and reasonable local public finances are important because 
the burden of the debt service bears not just economic, but a significant political impact 
within the municipality: the local citizens are not just taxpayers but also voters. Usually the 
constitutions and/or other fiscal rules regulate these principles.
For the above mentioned reasons, this paper examines numerous effective debt 
management strategies, taking a  multi-governance approach, and showing how 
responsibilities can be shared between central and local institutions.
Because of the cross-disciplinary nature of the topic, the analysis and evaluation (law 
and finances), the research is based on a comparative legal and economic methodology.4 
1 Davey 2011, 43. For non-EU members see Nalas 2011 (Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Mol-
dova, Montenegro, Republika Srpska – BiH, Romania, Serbia and Turkey).
2 Eurostat 2016; International Monetary Fund 2013. 
3 Nyikos 2013; Finžgar–Brezovnik 2019.
4 Schnyder 2016, 45.
149
ne
mz
et
kö
zi 
ki
te
ki
nt
és
 •
PRO PU BL IC O B ON O – M AG YA R KÖZ IG A Z G ATÁ S •  2 0 2 0 /1.
The legal method is based on the classical interpretation (grammatical or textual, historical, 
logical, systematic) of the relevant supranational and for some practical cases the national 
law sources, which are completed by the teleological and constitution conformity.5 For 
comparison, the EU regulations (e.g. stability pact or debt brake rules) are an important 
initiation. Besides the legal methodology, the study employs economic ones, especially 
the quantitative approach. The paper contains some comparative statistics (OECD and 
Eurostat) to evaluate certain results based on figures because it is important to match the 
provisions with economic performance. The debt management of local governments can 
be analysed by positive and normative law and finance (or law and economics), in the case 
of the latter the outcome of collective choices is considered “fair”, “just”, or “efficient”. 
For local governments, local self-governments and municipalities the European Union 
classification assigns them to the lower levels of Local Administrative Units (LAU level 2).
2. LOCAL GOVERNMENT DEBTS
The following basics deal briefly with the definition, the subjects and the structure of 
local debts. Debt means usually something, especially money, that is owed to someone 
else, or the state of owing something that can be expressed in monetary value. The 
meaning of money should be interpreted broadly, because local governments prefer in 
practice loans, bonds, account receivables, notes, and mortgages, which are all typical 
components of debt.
By subjects, the debt is owed by one party, the borrower or debtor, to a second party, 
the lender or creditor. The debtors are local governments, local self-governments, 
municipalities with fiscal autonomy. In the EU classification, it means the lower levels of 
Local Administrative Units (LAU level 2), which consists of municipalities or equivalent 
units. Concerning our topic, the owners of the debts, the creditors need to be divided 
into two main categories according to the type of debt. In the case of local government 
bonds, they can be anyone: natural persons (citizens), private and public, domestic 
or foreign, international legal persons. Credits and loans can be provided usually by 
banks, since this is considered as a business activity. In some Mediterranean and Nordic 
countries, specialised financial institutions, special-purpose vehicles or so-called local 
government financing vehicles were established by the state or the municipalities for 
local government financing.
5 Stelmach 2006, 148.
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Figure 1 • The amount of local government debts (million euro)  
(Source: Compiled by the author based on Local government debt, 2018)
The total local debt is worth 847.4 billion euros, the four-fifth of which (81.5%) belongs to 
six countries: France (201.8 billion euros, 23%), Germany (147.2 billion euros, 17%), Italy 
(128.2 billion euros, 15%), the United Kingdom (107.3 billion euros, 12%), the Netherlands 
(56.1 billion euros, 7.8%) and Sweden (50.4 billion euros, 6.7%). In some countries, the local 
government debt represents a high proportion of the general government debt: in Estonia 
it is 36%, in Sweden 26% or in Denmark 18.8% of the public debt, while in Finland and 
France it is close to 9% of the GDP.6
According to the characteristic of the local debt, the conditions relate to the amount 
and timing of repayments of principal and interest. In the case of loans, the lender usually 
sets up strict provisions, which have a restrictive impact on the local budget. Furthermore, 
the suitable coverage is also important, which is over and beyond the non marketable or 
limitedly marketable assets defined by the national legislation. However, it is easier for 
the local government to borrow a high amount in a short time. The bonds are the other 
typical debt obligation, for which the conditions are defined unilaterally by the issuing 
municipality, but it is a  slower process to accumulate the necessary amount. Usually, 
debt or bond financing will not be used to finance current operating expenditures, the 
purposes of these amounts are local developments, capital investments, constructions, own 
contribution to other credits or grants. On the other hand, municipalities use short-term 
debt to make up for uneven cash flows; in some Eastern European countries (for example, 
in Hungary) local governments borrow(ed) money for short term (1-2 months) to bridge 
the everyday liquidity difficulties, because of the delay of the supports from the central 
budget.
6 Vértesy 2019, 618; Local government debt, 2018; Structure of government debt, 2020.
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Figure 2 • Structure of local government debts  
(Source: Compiled by the author based on OECD 2017.)
In the examined European countries, an overwhelming proportion of the local government 
debt is denominated in loans, the average is 64.8%. Another significant rate belongs to the 
accounts payable: 29.5%, and only 11.8% is in bonds. According to these, it is simpler and 
easier for municipalities to borrow money from financial intermediaries, especially from 
the banking sector.7 Since there is a lower or no confidence in local bonds and securities,8 
collecting money directly from the market is more difficult. Sometimes it can be observed 
that after the local government cannot borrow more money from the banking system, it 
switches to bonds.9 For example, in Hungary, the municipalities owed 1.55 billion euros in 
loans and only 0.07 billion in bonds,10 and by 2010 the debt in bonds (2.12 billion euros) was 
nearly the same amount as credits and bills of exchange (1.96 billion euros).11 In Estonia the 
same situation can be found: the share of loans for municipal outstanding debt accounted 
7 Vértesy 2019, 619. 
8 Dzigbede 2016, 23–24.
9 Abada–Chuliáb–Gómez 2010, 2851–2860.
10 Lentner–Hegedűs 2019, 22; Aczél–Homolya 2011.
11 Lentner et al. 2019; the local governments’ credit and bonds on the basis of Hungarian local government 
reports 2005–2013.
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for 56%, that of bonds, 22%, the remaining part is made up of other accounts payable.12 
A similar trend can be found in China.13
It is worth mentioning that not just the indebtedness is the real problem14 but rather 
the financing of it. If the local government faces with a  relatively high debt, but it has 
a balanced budget and enough revenues, resources to pay off the loans and bonds, then 
the debt, it is just a temporary burden. Under the most favourable circumstances, the debt
 − is proportional in size and rate of growth in its tax base;
 − does not extend past the useful life of the facilities that it finances;
 − is not used to balance the operating budget;
 − does not require repayment schedules that put excessive burdens on operating 
expenditures; and
 − is not so high as to jeopardize the credit rating.15
3. DEBT MANAGEMENT STRATEGIES
The primary purpose of the debt management is redemption, which has many different 
ways, and it is difficult to generate a  best practice suitable for all local governments.16 
Another objective of it is to minimise the cost of borrowings in the medium or the long run, 
consistently with a prudent degree of risk. The question is rather complex because several 
methods and processes can be distinguished which can be applied parallelly, depending on 
the amount and the structure of the debt and the decision of the local government.17 The 
actions must be taken to correct any fundamental imbalance between responsibilities and 
resources. This also applies to the often murky financial relationship between municipal 
budgets and those of their utility companies and public service provider institutions (e.g. 
local public education, healthcare).
Within the Better Government Programme, the Ernst & Young defined some standards 
for the debt management of local government which can be considered as a best practice 
and worth to be followed by the central and local governments.
12 OECD 2017, Subnational government country profiles for Estonia.
13 For details, see ADB 2013.
14 Bethlendi–Lentner 2019. 
15 Spearman 2007, 362.
16 Denison–Guo 2015, 121.
17 Batley–Gibson 1993, 1.
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Table 1 • Major areas and standards in debt management of local governments  
(Source: Compiled by the author based on Bitner–Cichocki 2008, 49.)
Major areas Management standards
Long-term financial 
and investment 
planning
 1. Possession of a long-term financial plan (LFP) and long-term 
investment plan (LIP) covering more than 7 years
 2. Possession of LFP/LIP approved by the council 
(constitutive body)
 3. Possession of several versions of LFP/LIP
 4. Forecast of existing and future debt covering more than 7 years
Institutional and 
organisational 
management 
methods
 5. Permanent presence on the capital market
 6. Development of debt management policy (strategy)
 7. Designation of the unit (person) for debt management
 8. Possession of a rating
 9. Investor relations programme
Technical tools 
for improving 
management 
effectiveness
 10. Cooperation with an issuing house (lender) a) Bonds: 
negotiated terms or underwriting b) Credit: assessment of 
bids – effective cost or other criteria
 11. Broadening of local governments presence on the market 
a) Bonds: public or non-public issue b) Credit: denominated in 
local or foreign currency
 12. Management of financial risks inherent in raising outside 
funds
Generally four debt management categories can be classified for the redemption: changing 
the conditions (lower interest cost – debt conversion, advance refunding debt consolidation, 
compromise), repayment strategies (terminal annuity, snowball or stacking method, debt 
management agency), additional resources (surplus, sinking fund, specialised financial 
institutions), and finally, state intervention (bailout – consolidation, limitations, financial 
guardian – insolvency administrator).
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Debt management strategies
Changing the 
conditions
debt conversion
advance refunding
debt consolidation
compromise 
Repayment 
strategies
terminal annuity
snowball or stacking 
method
debt management 
agency 
Additional 
resources
additional tax
surplus
sinking fund
specialised nancial 
institutions
State intervention
bailout –
consolidation
limitations
nancial guardian –
insolvency 
administrator 
Figure 3 • Debt Management Strategies of Local Governments  
(Source: Compiled by the author)
3.1. Changing the conditions
First of all, it is important to emphasise that a change in the debt conditions (e.g. conversion, 
refunding, consolidation) does not mean repayment or redemption.
In the case of debts, the interest rate is a  crucial point. In the beginning, it is worth 
reducing the interest cost even on loans and bonds, therefore the cost of the debt service 
will be lower for the local government, and ultimately for taxpayers, particularly for local 
citizens. Since local government loans and bonds are market priced, even the municipality 
can seize the opportunity when the market interest rates fall. This case is suitable for debt 
conversion, while the conditions of the higher interest rate can be converted into conditions 
with a new, lower interest rate. This method bears public benefit, because it reduces the 
burden of the debt service and the taxpayers, therefore this amount can be used for public 
expenditures. Moreover, tax cuts can be applied, which results in a reduction in the degree 
of inequality in the local distribution of income. Dalton calls attention to the fact that debt 
conversion does not really relax the debt burden, because a reduction in interest rate reduces 
the ability of bondholders to pay taxes, which may cause a reduction in public revenue, 
thereby reducing the capacity of the local government to redeem loans.18 Nevertheless, 
this holds true only if the bondholders are local taxpayers or national citizens, if they are 
foreigners, they may not be subject to the local taxes.
18 Dalton 1971 and 2013, 282–284.
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The advance refunding means that the local government exchange the loans or securities 
for a  new loan or a  loan secured with a  longer maturity, usually for raising new funds 
in order to pay off the matured loans. The change of the maturity structure of the debt 
is generally a device for local economic stabilisation. This prolongs the average maturity 
structure of the existing local government debt, which tends to raise the interest rate. 
In the case of securities, they can become more attractive for the holders due to a higher 
yield. Since long-term local government bonds are not a good substitute for money, they 
increase the liquidity preference. Even in the banking system, the repayment is usually 
established through better conditions for the short term. There is a  strong correlation 
between maturity and the debt burden because for the long term the local government 
should impose a higher tax burden on the taxpayers, or rearrange the expenditures in the 
local budget. Under this method, the financial burden of the local government debt is not 
relinquished but accumulated, owing to the postponement of debt redemption.
The debt consolidation method means that the local government takes out a new loan 
to pay off other debts. Consequently, this allows grouping all or the relevant part of the 
debt under one plan that has a single interest rate. Sometimes it could be easier to handle 
one relatively large monthly payment than to pay off multiple accounts. It can reduce 
management costs.
Finally, if bankruptcy has occurred, the negotiation of a compromise or a composition 
can be a solution, where the conditions, the maturity can be redefined. In this situation the 
goal of the proceeding is to grant a stay of payment for the debtor with a view to seeking 
an arrangement with creditors, or attempts to enter into a composition arrangement with 
creditors. The composition means the debtor’s agreement with the creditors laying down 
the conditions for debt settlement, in particular on any allowances and payment facilities 
relating to the debt, the remission or assumption of certain claims, the approval of the 
debtor’s program for restructuring and cutting losses, or any action deemed necessary to 
restore or preserve the debtor’s solvency, including the duration of and the procedures for 
monitoring the implementation of the composition arrangement.19
3.2. Repayment strategies
A temporal, maturity strategy is that  –  in accordance with the fiscal year  –  the local 
government follows the practice of paying off the debt on the basis of a terminal annuity 
by equal annual installments. The burden of debt diminishes annually, and by the time 
of maturity it is fully paid off. This method facilitates the debt service for the planners 
and policy-makers, and is favourable even for the lenders. An important advantage of 
this is that it is not required to repay the entire principal on the maturity date defined in 
19 See Act XLIX of 1991.
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the borrowing agreement, which could easily upset the balance, since the debt has been 
amortised during the period.
There are two main repayment methods concerning how the redemption can take shape 
during the debt management by different ranking based upon the amount or the rates. 
In the case of snowball method, the focus is on the loan with the lowest balance (amount), 
regardless of the interest rate. This is a very common approach to managing multiple debts, 
and can be attractive not just for the municipality, but politically for the voters, too, because 
the leaders can communicate the success. According to surveys, people naturally follow 
this process.20 The second one is the stacking method, which lists the debts in order from 
highest to lowest interest rate. It involves making minimum payments on all debts except 
the one with the highest rate of interest and putting all extra money to that highest rate 
debt. Once it is paid off, the municipality then shifts the focus to the next highest rate loan.
If the local government cannot handle its indebtedness, a debt management agency can 
provide such services, in which financial, legal, and administrative experts establish the 
strategy. In this, the role of local government angels (similar to business angels) could be 
important, who can prepare guidelines based upon a cluster analysis.
3.3. Additional resources
The most evident and simplest method of debt redemption for the local government is 
to impose addi tional taxes on local citizens and firms in order to pay off the old loan’s 
principal and interests, or the bonds’ yield. The new taxes can be introduced, or the tax 
rates can be raised to a higher level, only within the legal framework (especially the acts 
on local taxes). This measure is as much simple, at least as much criticised. Although the 
fiscal balance can be re-established, it may create dissatisfaction among the local taxpayers. 
The inequality in the distribution of income means that during the redistribution the 
bond holders and lenders are preferred to the taxpayers. By the taxation of new subjects 
(buildings, arable land) or activities (tourism, business activity) the competitiveness 
of the local government can decrease. Nevertheless, even Keynes, Hayek and Dalton 
recommended taxes on private property and wealth with progressive rates as a method 
of public debt redemption, with the explanation that this is the least real burden on the 
society, and reduces the degree of inequality in the distribution.21 Anyway, this is a burden 
for both the current local community and, in the long term, the future generation. Later 
it will transform into political deficit during the local elections,22 as the taxpayers express 
their opinions and judgement as voters.
In rare and exceptional situations with favourable conditions, local governments are 
able to generate a surplus in the local budget, when this higher amount can be utilised as 
20 Amar et al. 2011.
21 Keynes 1940.; Hayek 1940.; Dalton 1923.
22 Bastida–Beyaert–Benito 2012.
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a prepayment in the case of loans, paying back another old debt, or buying back from the 
market (the creditors) their own bonds and securities. On the one hand, public expenditure 
can be reduced to create a budget with a surplus, which means less money for the local 
public services. The surplus can also be gained by additional taxes, which method was 
explained above. Finally, the local economy can perform better, or new transfers can be 
assigned by the central government, which usually rarely happens.
Otherwise, a local government may establish a separate fund known as the sinking fund 
for the purpose of debt management. Under this system, the municipality deposits a certain 
(fixed) percentage of its annual income into this in every year over an extended period 
of time (usually 10–15 years). By the time the debt matures, sufficient money gradually 
accumulates in this system for the redemption, and the burden of debt is spread evenly 
during the period. It works like a prudently created depreciation fund. Furthermore, the 
amount and the balance of the fund increases the credit worthiness of the municipality, 
inspires confidence among the lenders, or – as other benefits – it can be applied as a collateral 
for debt obligations of local government-owned companies, local firms, or socially 
underprivileged local citizens (e.g. large families). Another way to operate a sinking fund 
is to repurchase a fraction of the outstanding bonds (at a special call price – callable bonds) 
in the open market each year. In mainstream scholarship, Due and Musgrave support the 
sinking funds as the most systematic and best method of debt repayment or redemption.23 
In a  controversial method, the local government borrows a  new loan and credit, and 
then proceeds it to the sinking fund. Even though Dalton opined that they need to be 
accumulated only out of the current revenue, not out of new loans.24
According to the OECD subnational government country profiles (2017), in some 
countries, state or local government-owned specialised financial institutions (SFI) were 
established for additional resources. They are similar to the sinking fund, but their 
activities are like banking transactions.
Table 2 • EU member states with and without LG specialised financial institutions  
(Source: Compiled by the author based on OECD 2017 and NALAS 2011.)
Countries with SFIs Countries without SFIs
France, Italy, Portugal, Spain,
United Kingdom
Denmark, Finland, Sweden
+ Norway (not EU member)
Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech 
Republic, Cyprus, Denmark, Estonia, Germany, 
Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland, Romania, 
Slovakia, Slovenia
In France the Agence France Locale (France Local Agency) is fully-owned by the French 
local authorities themselves, and dedicated to their funding, distributing loans to their 
23 Mukherjee 2003, 161.
24 Dalton 1971 and 2013, 278–279.
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members by raising funds on the capital markets (pooled financing).25 In Italy, the cities 
and provinces receive funding from a government agency called Cassa Depositi e Prestiti 
(Deposit and Consignment Office).26 A similar institution can be found in Portugal, where the 
Fundo de Apoio Municipal (Municipal Resolution Fund) was created to provide assistance 
to distressed municipalities.27 In Spain, the Fondo de Liquidez Autonómica (Regional 
and Autonomous Liquidity Fund) was established in 2012.28 In the Nordic countries, the 
four main municipal funding vehicles in some cases have a long history: KommuneKredit 
(Denmark, 1898), KBN Kommunalbanken (Norway, 1926), Kommuninvesti Sverige AB 
(Sweden, 1986), and Municipality Finance PLC (Finland, 1989).29 Despite their creation at 
different times, they share many similarities:30
 − they are not-for-profit entities whose sole purpose is to provide sub-national 
governments with competitive funding;
 − they hold large market shares of sub-national government lending in their respective 
countries: in Denmark, more than 90-95%; in Finland, around 50%; in Norway, 
47%; and in Sweden, 40%;
 − they are owned by the sub-central or the central government, and they benefit from 
various forms of “last resort” support mechanisms;
 − they provide funding exclusively via the international bond markets, rather than via 
deposits;
 − they have low-risk credit portfolios; their 100% exposure to individual sub-central 
governments is mitigated by the strength of the Danish, Finnish, Norwegian and 
Swedish local government sectors.
Another example is the Public Works Loans Board, which is a  statutory body that acts 
as a  lending agent for sub-national governments in the UK, and the bulk of borrowing is 
channelled through this board.31 The Central and Eastern European countries usually handle 
a lower level of local government debt, therefore these institutions are not necessary for them.
3.4. State intervention
As it has already been mentioned, the central government/budget is not responsible 
for the local government debts, obligations or other consequences of the loss-making 
management. However, in some cases the central government bailout is the easiest way, 
25 Saoudi 2016.
26 Bassanini 2015. 
27 Tavares–Santos 2014.
28 Téllez–Pérez 2016, 37.
29 Edholm–Lundberg–Malmberg 2016.
30 Hulbert–Vammalle 2016, 9.
31 Nallathiga 2012. 
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which is sometimes covered by the expression consolidation, as a euphemism.32 In Hungary, 
the central government implemented a  comprehensive consolidation between 2011 and 
2014 in four phases, during which all the debts of the local governments were overtaken by 
the government in the course of the renewal of the local government system. Meanwhile, 
a  task-based financing system was introduced and many public tasks were transposed 
from local level to the state administration, e.g. healthcare and public education, which 
was widely criticised in many respects.33 The re-division of tasks also narrowed the 
central governmental resources for local governments from 4.19 billion euros in 2010 
to 2.20 billion euros in 2015. Finally, 2082 local governments were consolidated and the 
amount reached 4.56 billion euros.34 This amount was 2.78% of the GDP and 5.54% of 
the public debt in 2010. The Italian government set up a funding plan in 2013 to repay the 
subnational governments’ accumulated liabilities (debt buyback); the municipalities are 
financed through the Cassa Depositi e Prestiti.35
Table 3 • Types of limitations on local government debt  
(Source: Compiled by the author based on OECD 2017 and NALAS 2011.)
Balanced local budget
and/or a defined reduction goal
Authorisation  
of the borrowing
Austria, Estonia, Finland, 
Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, 
Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, 
Spain, Sweden, UK – England, 
Scotland and Wales
Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Germany, 
Hungary, Ireland, 
Latvia
Belgium, Croatia, France, 
Luxembourg, Slovenia, 
UK – Northern Ireland,  
Romania
Another method of state intervention is when the legislator – upon the initiative of the 
central government – defines limitations for the indebtedness of the local governments. 
These mean restrictions of the fiscal autonomy of local governments, and there is a possibility 
of political abuse, if the central government has enough power to commit discrimination 
among municipalities upon political grounds. But as an ultima ratio, they can prove to 
be useful to gain the sustainability of the general government debt, and to meet with the 
financial requirements of the Maastricht criteria. The limitations focus on a balanced local 
budget as well-defined reduction goals,36 or prescribe authorisation of the borrowing from 
the central government, or both of them are applied simultaneously. The different types of 
limitations are described in detail in the OECD subnational government country profiles 
(2017). Eastern European local governments are financially strongly dependent on central 
state transfers, therefore the deterioration of local government finances can be partially 
32 Dietrichson–Ellegård 2015.
33 Lentner 2019, 43. 
34 Steiner 2016, 13–14.
35 Kurti 2014.
36 Spearman 2007, 102–103.
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attributed to EU funds: the co-financing requirements place a huge financial burden on 
local governments which are already striving to find sufficient resources for the provision 
of local services.37
Based on the OECD subnational government country profiles, legal provisions for 
a balanced local budget and/or defined reduction goals can be found in Austria, where the 
Internal Stability Pact (2012) set a balanced budget prescription for all levels of government; 
in 2016 a  structural balance rule was implemented, and all levels of government must 
reduce their level of debt by 1/20 per year.38 In Estonia, limits for local debt were introduced 
from 2009 to 2012, and according to the Financial Management of Local Authorities Act 
(2011),39 the debt ceiling ranges from 60% to 100% of the current year; operational revenues 
depend on the self-financing capacity of the municipality. Local budgets in Finland must 
be balanced over a  four-year period, and the Municipal Act (2015) introduced a central 
government spending limit on local governments. However, unfortunately this deteriorating 
fiscal position pushed the municipalities to increase borrowing.40 In Greece, under the 
Kallikratis reform, an Observatory for Financial Autonomy of the Local Government 
Organizations was launched,41 which ensures the balanced budgets with additional limits: 
interest payments for a given year cannot exceed 20% of ordinary annual revenues, and 
total debt must remain under 60% of total annual revenues. Municipalities can join the 
Special Economic Recovery Program.42 In 1999, Italy has introduced an Internal Stability 
Pact to ensure – e.g. with borrowing limits, prudential rules on bond issuing – that the 
financial situation of subnational administrations be consistent with the EU fiscal rules. 
The constitutional budget stability rule with the principle that the deficits can no longer 
be financed through debt was passed in 2012.43 In the Netherlands, the Sustainable Public 
Finances Bill (2013) stipulates that municipalities are subject to a balanced budget rule, and 
may borrow loans or issue bonds only to finance capital expenditure.44 In Poland, the Public 
Finance Act defines the balanced local current budgets and strengthens debt limitations 
requiring that the sum of loan instalments and interest payments must not exceed 15% of 
the total debt.45 From 2014 the debt limit based on gross savings (instead of the revenues) was 
calculated over a three-year period. In Portugal, the Local Finance Law (2013) introduced 
new rules for arrears, off-balance sheet liabilities and expenditure ceilings, and also 
strengthened the net debt ceilings and borrowing constraints. In Slovakia, the subnational 
governments must follow a balanced budget rule, as well as debt ceilings since 2005.46 The 
37 Medve-Bálint–Bohle 2016, 22.
38 Bröthaler–Getzner–Haber 2015.
39 www.riigiteataja.ee/en/eli/523052014001/consolide.
40 André–García 2015, 31.
41 Law 4111/2013, which was further implemented by Law 4270/2014.
42 Zettelmeyer–Trebesch–Gulati 2013.
43 Brusca–Rossi–Aversano 2015.
44 Kickert 2012.
45 OECD 2015, 201.
46 Lentner et al. 2018.
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Fiscal Responsibility Constitutional Act (2011) and the Law on Budgetary Responsibility 
(2013) stipulated that local governments exceeding the debt limits must pay a fine imposed 
by the Ministry of Finance amounting to 5% of the difference between the total debt and 
the 60% ratio. In Spain, under the constitutional reform (2011), the fiscal consolidation 
was targeted for all the Spanish administration from 2020 onward. The Organic Law on 
Budgetary Stability and Financial Sustainability (2012) introduces a structurally balanced 
budget rule and debt ceilings, as well as expenditure rules.47 In Sweden, the municipalities 
and county councils are subject to a balanced budget requirement, they can borrow only 
to fund capital expenditure through bonds and loans. Within the United Kingdom, in 
England, Scotland and Wales, local governments are able to issue long-term debt to finance 
capital investments only. The local governments must follow the Prudential Code of the 
CIFPA (Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy), which sets indicators to 
be respected regarding affordability, sustainability and prudence.
In France, a  preliminarily required authorisation for the borrowing can be found, 
the subnational governments are not able to borrow without approval from the central 
government, and long-term borrowing is restricted to finance investment. Belgium has 
an internal stability pact covering the period 2015–2018 and co-ordination mechanisms 
established by the Cooperation Agreement in 2013 to implement the Fiscal Compact. 
Regions and communities can borrow and issue debt on financial markets, although they 
require authorisation from the Federal Minister of Finance; municipalities and provinces 
are free to borrow, but only to fund investment projects.48 In Luxembourg, any local loans 
in excess of 50,000 euros must be approved by the Ministry of the Interior. Borrowing is only 
allowed if there is no other financing option, the regular reimbursement of annual accruals 
is guaranteed, and loans are only permitted to fund capital expenditure. In  Slovenia, 
according to the Public Finance Act (1999) and the Financing of Municipalities Act (2006), 
municipalities have the right to borrow to finance certain types of investment projects only 
with the prior consent of the Ministry of Finance.49 “In Northern Ireland within the United 
Kingdom, borrowing is subject to approval by the Ministry of the Environment and must 
aim at financing capital projects only.”50
For dual limitation, balanced budget and authorisation rules are typical in the Czech 
Republic, where a new fiscal framework is under preparation for regulating local government 
indebtedness. This requires that the level of local gross debt remains below 60% of a four-
year average of revenues. The bond issuance must be approved by the Ministry of Finance. 
In Denmark, with the Budget Law (2012) a balanced budget rule and a multiannual binding 
expenditure ceiling were introduced, and the borrowing is subject to the supervision and 
approval of the central government. In Germany, the balanced structural budget provisions 
and a “debt brake rule” were introduced in 2011 at the federal and Länder levels following 
47 Brusca–Rossi–Aversano 2015.
48 Jennes 2014.
49 Oplotnik–Brezovnik–Vojinović 2012.
50 OECD 2020, 116.
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the 2009 constitutional reform. Local governments must balance their budgets and have 
borrowing restrictions, all must have the approval of the supervisory authority.51 Another 
example is Hungary, where the Fundamental Law and the Economic Stability Act (2011) states 
the principle of sustainable budgeting and prescribes certain conditions for any borrowing 
by local governments to the extent determined in the Stability Act,52 and/or the consent 
of the Government is required.53 The Act on Local Government prohibits the planning of 
operational deficit in the Financial Regulation. In Ireland, the government in 2004 and 2009 
set a limit of 200 million euros for contribution to the local government sector in any one 
year. The Local Government Reform Act (2014) states that a  local authority may borrow 
money in any manner it considers suitable for the effective performance of its functions, 
but it needs prior approval of the central government.54 In Latvia, local governments can 
only carry out long-term borrowing to finance investment projects, and the loans must be 
contracted with the State Treasury or within specific funding programmes, or borrowing 
from another institution must be justified and authorised by the Ministry of Finance. The 
borrowing in a given year cannot exceed 20% of current revenues.
0%
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EE EL ES FI IT NL PL PT SE SK CZ DK DE HU IE LV UK BE FR LU SI
Balanced local budget and/or a dened
reduction goal
Both Authorisation of
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LG debt % GDP LG debt % public debt Av. % GDP Av. % public debt
Figure 4 • Types of limitation and the local government debt in % of GDP and % of public 
debt (Source: Compiled by the author based on OECD 2017)
51 Fossen–Freier–Martin 2014.
52 Hegedűs–Lentner 2020. 
53 Nyikos 2013; The Fundamental Law of Hungary Article 34 Paragraph (5), Act CXCIV of 2011 on the eco-
nomic stability of Hungary Article 10-10/D; 353/2011. (XII. 30.) Government decree on the detailed rules for 
the consent to debt-generating transactions.
54 Local Government Reform Act 2014 Article 106 S.I. No. 215 of 2014, which modified the Local Government 
Act 2001.
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All the three solutions are followed by numerous countries, most of them apply the rules on 
balanced local budget and/or defined reduction goals, while the authorisation of borrowing 
is also popular. Unfortunately, there is no correlation between the regulation method and 
the results in local government debts, because in each group some outstanding value can 
be found. But it can be observed that the average is the lowest in the authorised borrowing 
with a balanced budget prescription method (3.6% of the GDP, but 7.5% of the public debt). 
Despite these figures, the authorisation reduces the average in the case of the public debt 
(5.1%), but remains higher relative to the GDP (4.4%). It is highest in the solely balanced 
budget group (5.2% of the GDP and 11.6% of the public debt).
Another exceptional resolution is when for ultimate debt management a  financial 
guardian or an insolvency administrator is delegated to the local government by the central 
government to conduct the debt settlement procedure. Since this procedure is similar to 
bankruptcy proceedings, it should be under the supervision of the relevant court, e.g. 
ordinary court, administrative court or registry court. This process may be initiated 
by either the local government or its creditor(s). The financial guardian monitors the 
management of the local government, reveals the reasons for the indebtedness, has access 
to all documents relating to the assets of the local government, prepares a referral on debt 
settlement, initiates the recovery of the overdue receivables, contacts with the creditors, 
carries out the duties and powers mandated by the law. Upon the results of the monitoring, 
the local government (or a  debt settlement committee) establishes a  crisis budget and 
financial plan, and in the case of insolvency, a  proposal for compromise. In Hungary, 
separate legislation defines the specific regulation.55
4. CONCLUSIONS
While a  considerable part of public debt originates from the budgetary practices of 
municipalities, the amount of local government debts is not a  major problem in the 
European countries. The average local debt ratio is approximately 3.8% of the GDP and 
6.7% of the public debt. Therefore, it is not a significant macroeconomic obstacle for most 
of the EU member states to meet the Maastricht criteria. Only a few countries are faced 
with difficulties: Estonia, Sweden, Denmark in the proportion of the general government 
debt, and Finland and France in relation to the GDP. The total local debt amounts to nearly 
850 billion euros, the four-fifths of which belongs to six countries (France, Germany, Italy, 
the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and Sweden). An overwhelming proportion of it is 
denominated in loans since it is simpler and easier for municipalities to borrow money 
from the financial intermediaries, and they are able to provide suitable coverages. It can be 
observed that according to the structure of the LAU 2 level, in countries with larger and 
more populous local governments (the United Kingdom, Denmark, the Netherlands or 
55 For details, see Act XXV of 1996 on the debt settlement procedure of local governments.
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Sweden) the sum of the local government debt is not so high, but for a single municipality 
or for a local citizen, it still means a higher burden.
The purpose of debt management is the redemption, which has many different ways, 
and it is difficult to generate a satisfactory general theory for it. The golden principle states 
that the consequences of the loss-making management of the local government are borne 
by the local government, and the central budget is not responsible for its obligations. Four 
debt management categories can be classified: changing the conditions (debt conversion, 
advance refunding, debt consolidation, compromise); repayment strategies (terminal 
annuity, snowball or stacking method, debt management agency); additional resources 
(surplus, sinking fund, specialised financial institutions); and finally, state intervention 
(bailout – consolidation, limitations, financial guardian – insolvency administrator).
Unfortunately, there are no good or best practices for the first two methods, since they 
are closer to the business sphere, and municipalities have not enough financial and fiscal 
potential to rearrange the local budget. For additional resources, in some Mediterranean 
(France, Portugal, Spain, Italy) and Nordic countries (Sweden, Denmark, Finland, Norway), 
state or local government-owned specialised financial institutions were successfully 
established. In other European countries, unsustainable local government debt has emerged 
as a problem, and finally, the state pays the bailout or consolidation by overtaking the debt. 
In another form of state intervention, the legislator  –  upon the initiative of the central 
government – defines limitations. These restrict the fiscal autonomy of local governments, 
but as an ultima ratio, they can prove to be useful to gain the sustainability of the general 
government debt. The limitations focus on two main areas: a  balanced local budget as 
a  well-defined reduction goal, or a  prescribed authorisation of the borrowing from the 
central government. In five countries, both of them are applied simultaneously. Finally, in 
most cases, only the direct and/or indirect state intervention methods were proven to be 
successful solutions.
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